I. INTRODUCTION
The golden grizzly bear (Ursus arctos californicus California. With its distinctive hump and golden sheen, it is the mascot of many University of California schools, including UCLA, UC Berkeley, and UC Riverside. For centuries, golden grizzly bears thrived in the mountains and forests of the as ground squirrels. Large and voracious omnivores, the golden grizzlies shaped the California ecosystem. Despite its critical role in the ecological community and several ambitious ecologists have in recent years called for restoration of the grizzly across much of its historic range. 1 Recognizing the ecological value of these bears and other large predators, but also the ostensible arbitrariness of choosing to restore only back to a pre-Gold Rush state, some have suggested a considerably more controversial approach to restoration. 2 throughout North America, stems back at least to the Pleistocene epoch, some 12,000 -Approached technically, ecological restoration appears to require that the environment be returned as near as possible to its original, untrammeled state. The common as "strictly speaking . . . an attempt to return a system to some historic state." 3 Call this the "baseline problem." Practically speaking, the baseline problem restoration. Indeed, returning the golden grizzly bear to California may be neces-4 Our concern in this paper is primarily ethical and conceptual, though of course 2 Tim Caro, "The Pleistocene Re-Wilding Gambit," Trends in Ecology and Evolution Nature - We believe that our position has several advantages over prior strategies for approaching restoration questions. First and foremost, it avoids the baseline probresponsibility. Third, it addresses a corollary problem related to assisted migration and climate adaptation. 5 Fourth, it elides, or at least sidelines, overt valuations of nature. Finally, it avoids unresolved moral considerability and moral status questions. 6 Other theories of environmental restoration offer relational stances as must raise questions about blame, value, moral status, and so forth, but these are all questions that ought not to stymie the obligation to restore. the establishment of moral status or environmental value in order to offer a reason for restoration. We note that both moral status and the question of environmental examples aimed at prime intuitions and escort the reader to the conclusion that the 5 Problem," in Max Boykoff and Susan Moser, eds., Toward Successful Adaptation: Linking Science and Practice in Managing Climate Change Impacts Vol. 36 restore can neither be completely discharged by reconstructing a natural system nor uptake in the form of independent validation from a party of experts, evaluators, and affected parties.
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II. BACKGROUND
Restoration efforts range from recovery of lost habitat to ecosystem management -erally speaking, restoration is a response to some prior degradation caused directly Actor A causes damage to some environment E, and is then morally obligated because of this damage to undo or repair the damage. Under most circumstances, "reparation" is thus presumed to mean "restore E to its original undamaged state," that a "lost good" may be re-incorporated into an ecosystem. 7 It is common in the discussion of environmental degradation to focus on these responsible for environmental degradation have an obligation to restore this lost value.
"restoration thesis." 8 compensated for by the later creation of something of equal value." 9 Elliot aims not intrinsic value." 10 -there previously, but some critical original value is no longer in place. The loss At least three responses to Elliot have aimed at moving the discussion of restora-11 Katz suggests that restoration, in addition to being impossible, is yet a further expression that humanity has the obligation or ability to repair or reconstruct damaged natural systems," is rooted in the presumption that restorations can only ever be artifacts. If restoration is not authentic (or even ontologically possible), then restoration does little more than give license to destroy nature. Both Katz and Elliot claim that any malicious restoration, benevolent restoration, clean-up. 12 culture of nature." 13 He claims that the ontogenesis of nature need not matter for Light advocates that restored nature is not so much like an art forgery, but rather more akin to an art restoration, and that engaging in restoration can be thought of as by having humans be a part of this relationship. This has value for us as humans, promote human-nature relationships. We think that an understanding of our obligations stemming from human imintuitions suggest that restoration necessitates undoing environmental damage, but also that not all environmental damage is of the sort that can or even ought to be repaired by restoration. A comprehensive understanding of restoration includes discussion of accountability. It also avoids the baseline problem. Not so long ago, in an attempt to reorient the environmental discussion, Onora based reasoning may better serve our environmental goals. 15 As she sees it, the on environmental rights and moral standing (rights-based reasoning) to emphasize -stand the obligation to restore. by ruining her daisies, by violating her property rights, or by disrespecting her or something of value to her. Given these presumptions, Norville ought to undo the -Norville may feel some obligation to repair the damage that he has done.
him for his malice. In these cases, something more than simple replacement of the left on a vacation after securing a commitment from Norville to look after the daisies. to replace them. are themselves established by the interpersonal arrangements that support them.
as an extension of this, restorations).
Spot:
In this case, Norville himself cannot clearly be said to have destroyed something ofties for the actions of their pets because they have assumed an obligation not only to care for the pet, but also to account for negative outcomes resulting from the daisies and the trespass on her property. ought to at least apologize to Velma and perhaps take action to prevent such occurrences in the future (e.g., he could build a higher fence). Such ideas are reasonably captured by the notion of trespass. For the most part, trespass remains ensconced in standard conceptions of violation and property rights. 23 To adequately address such degradation in this case, he must seek reconciliation Public Park: daisies in a city park.
Norville and Spot are hiking in the backcountry. True to his nature, Spot dashes off and digs up a patch of parachute beard tongue, an endangered Assume for the sake of argument that this place in the backcountry has no proprietors and no assigned regime of management. For example, it is neither a national park 24 Intuition suggests that Norville still has an obligation this case may involve restoring (or ensuring that others restore) the ecosystem. The 
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25 This approach to the problem, --rather in his failure to offer (or simply to "have") adequate reasons for damaging For our purposes here, it is further critical to see that prescriptions for reparaunderstood as meeting the standards of some as-yet undetermined reasonableness ," parachute beard tongue, no particular member of the moral community may be affor Spot, and because Spot has caused the damage, Norville is thereby responsible is rooted in something other than the mere fact that damage has been done, and placed himself. His obligation, more generally, is an obligation to the moral com-
,"
requiring restoration of something important to Velma. Perhaps he must restore ,"
be easy to misinterpret this case as requiring perhaps consensual uptake from Velma. But as before, this explanation underdetermines the problem, since it does not help ,"
that offer -the moral community could accept. There are several other approaches to explain the source of these obligations, almost all salient respects similar to "Public Park," such that obligations to repair does not fall cases to include, say, damage or trespass to the planet, and aim to understand such for respecting the Earth.
or invalid.
26 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 156.
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Christine Korsgaard offers a distinction that can help make our thinking about such obligations clearer. In Sources of Normativity, she is careful to distinguish to other agents, and indirect obligations with regard to non-agents. 26 ration is already presumed in the restoration discourse. One might argue as much of environmental damage, for instance, the perpetrators have died or disappeared. environmental restorations simply can never be completed. It seems strange to sugmany ordinary intuitions about restoration.
VI. CONCLUSION
California is as yet an open question. Grizzlies require a lot of habitat, and they -been negatively impacted by poaching, hunting, pollution, habitat encroachment, ecological feasibility complications that grizzlies do. Vol. 36 causes incremental, albeit minimal, degradation to the grass. Most of us feel little need to restore environments that are the consequence of such actions. Certainly some level of environmental degradation is not only permissible, but ought to be countenanced, and perhaps even encouraged.
attempt to set aside an abiding concern of the restoration community by observ----the baseline problem by suggesting that obligations to restore can only rightly be parties.
